Dissertation
I'm currently developing a disjunctivist direct-realist account of veridical, illusory and hallucinatory experience. These papers form part of my solution to the problem of perception. The problem is that the arguments from illusion and hallucination purportedly show that our naive conception of perceptual experience is untenable.
Other topics that interest me...
Other topics that I've written on include bodily awareness, proprioception's role in intentional action, and Hume's General Point of View.
Here are abstracts of papers I've presented at the American Philosophical Association. The papers are currently undergoing corrective surgery and I will post them when I'm happy with them...
Illusion Without Contents?
Presented at the Pacific APA, April 2007. It is widely assumed that perceptual experiences have contents. M.G.F. Martin, John Campbell, Bill Brewer, and Charles Travis have recently criticized this assumption. The central rationale for the assumption is that it allows a natural and elegant treatment of illusion in terms of bearing a perceptual attitude to false contents. Travis argues that his alternative account of illusion - which does not invoke contents - undermines the central rationale for the assumption. This paper reconstructs and assesses Travis's account of illusion. He explains illusory experiences in terms of false expectations about the world rather than as misrepresentations of it. I argue that his proposal fails to plausibly account for the robustness of certain illusions. The central rationale for the assumption remains untouched.
Public Languages, Knowledge, and Semantic Norms
Presented at the Eastern APA, December 2006. Are public languages required to explain communicative success between speakers? Wiggins thinks so, but Heck doesn't. I assess two arguments by Wiggins and Heck's responses. Firstly, the Argument from Knowledge concludes that public languages are required for a speaker's knowledge of the meaning of utterances. But Heck shows that mere common knowledge of meaning suffices. I show that common knowledge in this context must make reference to linguistic practices - but this falls short of public languages. Secondly, the Argument from Normativity concludes that public languages undergird semantic norms. But Heck argues that general features of the communicative situation generate semantic norms. I argue that Heck's proposal fails because such features raise symmetrical reasons for speakers to conform to each other, rather than for one speaker to defer to the semantic norm. I show that linguistic practices, though not public languages, play a crucial role for communicative success.